CARNIVORE
Former
CIA Director R. James Woolsey seems to have been lobbying for the
war in Iraq in order to get employment.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63223-2003Mar31.html
Pentagon, State Spar On Team to Run Iraq
Rumsfeld Rejects State Dept. Choices
By Karen DeYoung and Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, April 1, 2003; Page A25
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has rejected a team of officials
proposed by the State Department to help run postwar Iraq in what
sources described as an effort to ensure the Pentagon controls every
aspect of reconstructing the country and forming a new government.
While vetoing the group of eight current and former State Department
officials, including several ambassadors to Arab states, the Pentagon's
top civilian leadership has planned prominent roles in the postwar
administration for former CIA director R. James Woolsey and others
who have long supported the idea of replacing Iraq's government, according
to sources close to the issue.
The dispute is over who will occupy what are designed as de facto
cabinet ministries under retired Gen. Jay M. Garner, the Pentagon-named
head of a new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,
until the country can be fully handed over to Iraqis. By interagency
agreement, portfolios such as education and trade were to be filled
by the State Department, with the Pentagon choosing the "civilian
advisers" for other departments. Sources said that Walter Slocum,
who served as undersecretary of defense during the Clinton administration,
has been penciled in for the Iraqi defense ministry. Slocum declined
to comment last night.
The Pentagon had listed Woolsey for the Iraqi information ministry,
sources said, until the White House suggested he might be inappropriate
because of his CIA background and close association with one faction
of the incohesive Iraqi opposition. Sources said that he is still
in consideration for a variety of jobs. Asked yesterday whether he
is joining Garner's team, Woolsey said he felt such information should
come from the government rather than from him.
Garner had asked the State Department for a list of names, and the
eight selected officials went through security and other training
in preparation for departure for Kuwait last week. At the last minute,
however, they were told to "stand down" until further notice.
"We've been told there is a big disagreement between State and
Defense over who controls the personnel in Garner's group," said
one of the officials. One source said that Rumsfeld had labeled the
group of officials "too low-profile and bureaucratic" for
the work envisioned in Iraq. In the chain of command, Garner's office
falls under Gen. Tommy R. Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command,
which is running military operations in Iraq. Franks answers to Rumsfeld.
Divisions between the State and Defense departments have marked virtually
every phase of Iraq policy, beginning with President Bush's decision
last summer to follow Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's advice
to take the issue of disarming the Iraqi government to the United
Nations. When the U.N. effort fell apart early last month, the two
sides came together on the decision to launch a war to unseat Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. But disagreements have reemerged over differing
visions of Iraq's postwar future, with the State Department looking
for a less visible U.S. military role and perhaps ultimately a U.N.
administration.
Powell and senior State Department officials, along with British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, have maintained that a quick turnover from
U.S. military control to the United Nations would give postwar Iraq
more international legitimacy. They believe it also would encourage
participation in the reconstruction effort by countries that opposed
Bush's decision to go to war without U.N. authorization.
But Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul D. Wolfowitz, supported by Vice
President Cheney, have been leery of any substantial U.N. role on
grounds that it would inhibit U.S. ability to shape Iraq's future.
Under a postwar plan supervised by Undersecretary of Defense Douglas
J. Feith, the military would maintain control of Iraq for an indefinite
period, until new institutions could be constructed and a representative
Iraqi government installed. The plan allows a U.N. role in humanitarian
assistance, under U.S. supervision.
Acutely sensitive to reports of divisions within its ranks, the Bush
White House carefully controls the administration's public face. Senior
officials at both the State Department and the Pentagon declined to
comment yesterday on the dispute over Garner's team. A spokesman for
Feith referred all questions to the National Security Council staff
at the White House, which also declined to comment.
With the war in Iraq expected to continue for weeks, if not months,
the delayed arrival of any U.S. personnel in Baghdad has allowed disagreements
to fester. As Garner waits in Kuwait for his personnel roster to be
filled, another conflict has developed over who controls the distribution
of humanitarian assistance. In a March 26 letter to Rumsfeld, sources
said, Powell explained his understanding that civilian authorities,
and not the Pentagon, would be in charge.
The quick distribution of food and medical aid as a means of winning
over the Iraqi citizenry has been an integral part of U.S. plans for
the war and its aftermath. U.S.-controlled parts of the country were
to be flooded with assistance, supervised by State Department relief
officials in coordination with nongovernmental organizations and the
United Nations. Aid workers have insisted for months to Defense Department
planners that they must not be seen as an arm, or even a close partner,
of the U.S. military. Although U.S.-led troops would be expected to
provide essential security, the non-governmental organizations said,
they needed to make their own decisions about which needy communities
to help.
In written guidance for its own personnel, the United Nations warned
that their "operational independence" must be guaranteed.
While coordination should occur between the highest U.N. and U.S.
levels on the ground, it says, U.N. workers must maintain independent
ability to negotiate access to those in need with "all parties
to the conflict," and should not use "military assets"
to facilitate their work except in cases of "extreme and exceptional
circumstances."
Relief workers have been particularly concerned that the U.S. military
will use political criteria to decide who receives relief. In the
town of Zubair on Saturday, U.S. forces delivered two truckloads of
food and supplies to a Shiite Muslim religious leader deemed friendly
by U.S. Special Forces units. "It's causing all kinds of problems
in the field," said a representive of one nongovernmental relief
organization. "If the military takes control of humanitarian
assistance, you'll have no NGOs being able to work with the Defense
Department and you'll have issues with the U.N. You will make it into
a unilateral U.S. response."
Powell's letter to Rumsfeld, sources said, "clarified"
that U.S. Disaster Response Teams, known as DARTs, which are coordinating
the effort among the various relief agencies, would report to the
State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development (AID),
rather than to Garner. "Garner can be the best guy in the world,"
said one administration official who opposed Garner's control of the
relief effort, "but he is painted with Pentagon colors and that
will turn away a number of partners" from the U.N. and nongovernmental
communities. "I don't think this administration needs the turmoil
that would ensue."
In a letter last week to Bush, a group of prominent U.S.-based aid
organizations, including CARE, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and
Refugees International, asked that the job of coordinating humanitarian
aid be turned over to the United Nations.
© 2003 The Washington Post Company